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Abstract
This essay explores upon two inter-related issues: (1) the course of America’s raging
Afghan war as actually experienced on the ground as contrasted with the Pentagon and
mainstream media narrative and (2) the unrelenting Obama/Pentagon efforts to control
the public narrative of that war.1
As the real war on the ground spread geographically and violence intensified, U.S. efforts
to construct a positive spin re-doubled. An examination of bodies – of foreign occupation forces and innocent Afghan civilians – reveals a clear trade-off. NATO country
elites understand the quagmire and have begun pulling-back.
Keywords: body trade-offs; civilian deaths caused by the US/NATO (2001-2010);

critical analysis of Afghan civilian body counts; Pentagon means to control war
narrative; phases of America’s war in Afghanistan.

Resumen

1. The universality of war
propaganda is striking as a
comparison between the
Russian war narrative than and
the U.S/NATO war narrative
today reveals, details in Glenn
Greenwald, “The Universality of
War Propaganda. A soldier with
the Russian army in Afghanistan
recounts what they believed
about their mission,” Salon.com
(October 28, 2009) at http://
www.salon.com/news/opinion/
glenn_greenwald/2009/10/28/
propaganda
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Este artículo investiga dos cuestiones relacionadas: (1) la experiencia sobre el terreno
de la feroz guerra de EE.UU. en Afganistán, en contraste con el relato del Pentágono
y los medios de comunicación dominantes; (2) los implacables esfuerzos de Obama y
el Pentágono para controlar el relato público sobre esta guerra. Mientras la guerra real
se extendía geográficamente y la violencia se intensificaba, se redoblaban también los
esfuerzos de los EE.UU. para construir una lectura positiva. El examen de los cadáveres
(de las fuerzas extranjeras de ocupación y de los civiles afganos inocentes) revela una
situación de intercambio. Las élites de los países de los países de la OTAN han comprendido que se han metido en un callejón sin salida y comienzan a dar marcha atrás.
Palabras clave: intercambio de cadáveres; muertes civiles producidas por los EEUU y
la OTAN (2001-2010); análisis crítico de las cuentas sobre muertes civiles afganos; los
medios del Pentágono para controlar el relato bélico; fases de la guerra de los EEUU
en Afganistán.
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2. See “The American Occupation of Afghanistan and the
Birth of a National Liberation
Movement,” Global Research
(September 7, 2010) at http://
www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=20946 .
The article is cited some 8,900
times in a Google search (at 9:43
AM EST on November 19, 2010).

Herold, M. The Obama/Pentagon War Narrative, the Real War and Where Afghan Civilian Deaths Do Matter

Introduction.
I believe that the end of the Afghan war will be “determined more by bodies than by
politics or deals”. The period 2002-6 was an incubating period for the resurgence of
the Taliban and its allies. U.S. raids on the ground transformed what had been a fragmented Afghan resistance into a war of national liberation, a matter I have addressed
elsewhere in a widely reproduced essay2. The rest is history: a trend of soaring Afghan
civilian deaths, escalating violence, local military and US/NATO occupation forces
deaths and spreading insecurity. The following systems’ chart highlights the essential
feedback elements at work in the America’s Afghan war:
Figure 1. Deadly Trade-offs in Afghanistan

3. As beautifully expressed in
“The American public is conditionally tolerant of [military]
casualties and consistently
indifferent to collateral damage,”
Dr. Karl P. Mueller, School of
Advanced Airpower Studies,
Maxwell Air Force Base.
4. In “Obama’s Unspoken TradeOff: Dead US/NATO Occupation
Troops versus Dead Afghan
Civilians?” RAWA News (August
23, 2009) at http://www.rawa.
org/temp/runews/2009/08/23/
obamaand-8217-s-unspokentrade-off-dead-us-nato-occupation-troops-versus-deadafghan-civilianso.phtml
5. See my “Obama’s Afghan
War. The New Metric of Civilian
Casualties,” Global Research
(June 12, 2009) at http://www.
globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.
php?articleId=13957
6. See Spencer Ackerman, “Spin
War Shift: Military now Bragging
about Afghan Air Strikes,” Wired.
com (September 1, 2010) at
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/09/nato-brags-onair-strikes-hits-talibans-civiliancasualties / , Noah Schactman,
“Bombs Away: Afghan Air War
Peaks with 1,000 Strikes in October,” Wired.com (November 10,
2010) at http://www.wired.com/
dangerroom/2010/11/bombsaway-afghan-air-war-peakswith-1000-strikes-in-october/
7. Emphasis added by M.H.
http://accuracy.org/newsrelease.php?articleId=2390. Rosen
is author of the new book Aftermath: Following the Bloodshed
of America’s Wars in the Muslim
World (Nation Books, 2010)
8. The three main fallacies driving America’s Afghan war have
been rebutted in Johann Hari,
“The Three Fallacies That Have
Driven the War in Afghanistan,”
The Independent (October
21, 2009) at http://www.
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The essential link is that America’s Afghan war causes civilian casualties which, in turn,
fuel the Afghan resistance which, in turn, causes more U.S casualties. No link exists
between Afghan and U.S civil societies, i.e. rising civilian casualties in America’s foreign wars have never caused the U.S general public to become anti-war3. McChrystal’s
alleged effort to reduce Afghan civilian casualties (-) was a trade-off for rising U.S military casualties (++) as I demonstrated a year ago4. Figure 1 makes an essential point:
the United States can pursue its war but the result will be either soaring Afghan civilian
casualties or escalating U.S. military deaths. Whereas Gen. Stanley McChrystal opted
for the latter, his successor clearly has chosen the former. McChrystal had pronounced
the much ballyhooed new metric of civilian casualties5. Ackerman writes, “Since Gen.
David Petraeus took command of the war effort in late June 2010, coalition aircraft
have flown 2,600 attack sorties. That’s 50% more than they did during the same period
in 2009. Not surprisingly, civilian casualties are on the rise, as well.” Thus, air strikes
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independent.co.uk/opinion/
commentators/johann-hari/
johann-hari-the-three-fallaciesthat-have-driven-the-war-inafghanistan-1806191.html. Also
Eric Margolis,”Lies Drive the
Afghan War,” Huffington Post
(October 16, 2009) at http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/ericmargolis/lies-drive-the-afghanwar_b_324194.html
9. A superb analysis of many
of these is made in William
R. Polk, “Elements of a U.S.
Strategy toward Afghanistan,”
The Atlantic (September 2, 2010)
at http://www.theatlantic.com/
international/archive/2010/09/
elements-of-a-us-strategytoward-afghanistan/62436/
10. Elizabeth A. Kennedy, “WikiLeaks: Bribery, Graft Rampant
in Afghanistan,” Associated
Press (December 3, 2010) at
http://news.yahoo.com/s/
ap/20101203/ap_on_re_as/
as_wikileaks_afghanistan and
Scott Share, Mark Mazetti and
Dexter Filkins, “Cables Describe
Scale of Afghan Corruption as
Overwhelming,” New York Times
(December 3, 2010).
11. Susanne Koelbl, “U.S. Funds
Used to Buy Villas for wealthy
Afghans,” ABC News (July 6,
2010) at http://abcnews.
go.com/International/usfunds-buy-villas-rich-afghans/
story?id=11093986 .also Richard
Spencer, James Kirkup and
Damien McElroy, “The Karzai
Empire, Villas in Dubai and
Fears over Afghan Aid,” The Daily
Telegraph (September 10, 2010)
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/middleeast/
dubai/7994754/The-Karzaiempire-villas-in-Dubai-andfears-over-Afghan-aid.html
12. Robert Dreyfuss, “Afghan
Farce: ‘Taliban’ Talker was
Phony” at http://www.uruknet.
fo/?p=m72099&hd=&size=1&l=e
and Dan Froomkin, “Massive
U.S. Spending on ‘Rule of Law’
in Afghanistan not Paying Off,”
Washington Post (November 23,
2010) at http://www.e-ariana.
com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/
E3045C51F2038BAA872577E40
05BECDC?OpenDocument
13. These last two indicators
are taken from Nick Turse, “How
Much ‘Success’ Can Afghans
Stand?” Tomdispatch.com (Sept-
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are “in” again and the U.S. military is even brazenly bragging about them6. But such
news is found primarily in the Blogosphere at Wired.com and not to be seen in the
New York Times, Washington Post or on PBS/NPR.
Everything indicates more of the same as during 2006-9. As Nir Rosen points out,
Obama has set an arbitrary deadline of 2014, but his generals are doing the same
thing again and again and expecting different results. There is no evidence of progress on any front and every reason to believe next year in Afghanistan will be worse
than this year. We mistakenly see Afghanistan through the prism of Iraq. But the
‘surge’ did not reduce violence in Iraq. It was Iraqi social and political dynamics. And
none of these elements have their Afghan equivalents. And Iraq remains more violent than Afghanistan. We spend so much time thinking about what we can do in
Afghanistan that we ignore the question of whether we even should do it7.
I shall address neither the fallacies put out by Bush/Obama to justify the Afghan war8
nor a host of issues analyzed by others which I take as givens providing the context for
the raging war9. These include:
●●warlords continue to dominate across most of Afghanistan as confirmed in recent
elections;
●●Afghanistan is either the most or second-most corrupt nation in the world. Karzai’s
brother in Kandahar is both a major drug dealer and on the CIA payroll to provide
security. Released WikiLeaks documents reveal rampant bribery, graft, etc.10;
●●Numerous national-level Afghan politicians are on the CIA payroll;
●●much of foreign aid disappears, e.g., U.S funds were used to buy 14 oceanfront villas
on the super-luxurious Palm Jumeirah development in Dubai for wealthy Afghans11;
●●that $76.5 billion of the $80 billion committed to Afghanistan has been spent
on military and security and much of the remaining $3.5 billion on international
consultants;
●●most of the so-called reconstruction involved high-visibility glamor projects like
highways, malls and luxury hotels;
●●The United States is now spending nearly half a billion dollars a year in an attempt
to establish the “rule of law” in Afghanistan. But a new government report suggests it
may just be that much more money down the drain12;
●●Afghanistan ranks dead last amongst 163 countries on a food security index;
●●Between 2004 and 2009, Afghanistan went from being 173rd out of 178 countries
to being 181st out of 182 nations on the United Nations’ human development index13;
●●Poverty is unimaginable – 13% of Afghans have access to clean drinking water and
6% to toilets14;
●●Kabul is awash with a NGO mafia15 notwithstanding that some admirable work has
been carried by the likes of OXFAM, DACCAR, etc.;
●●poppy and hashish cultivation continue (of course, demand creates its own supply)
with Afghanistan being the world’s biggest producer of both16;
●●vapid hype about peace talks with ex-Taliban members not involved today in the
Afghan resistance, most recently a fake Taliban who made it all the way to Karzai’s
palace to “negotiate” underscoring how little the US/NATO know about the Taliban17;
●●sham elections (mostly for Western consumption) with most Afghans disillusioned
by electoral politics18;
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ember 13, 2010) at http://www.
tomdispatch.com/blog/175293/
tomgram%3A_nick_turse,_
afghanistan_on_life_support__/
14. See my “An Excess of
Corruption and a Deficit of
Toilets: American and Karzai’s
‘Successes’ in Afghanistan,” RAWA
News (September 28, 2010) at
http://www.rawa.org/temp/
runews/2010/09/28/an-excessof-corruption-and-a-deficit-oftoilets-american-and-karzai-ssuccesses-in-afghanistan.phtml
15. See Walter Mayr, “Exotic
Birds in a Cage. Criticism Grows
of Afghanistan’s Bloated NGO
Industry,” Der Spiegel Online
(September 22, 2010) at http://
www.spiegel.de/international/
world/0,1518,718656,00.html
16. “Afghanistan is World’s
Largest Hashish Producer, UN
Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur
(March 31, 2010 at 10.18 GMT)
and Chris Hedges, “Opium, Rape
and the American Way,” Truthdig
(November 2, 2009) at http://
www.commondreams.org/
view/2009/11/02
17. Matthew Rosenberg and
Adam Entous, “Sign of War Gains
Prove False,” Wall Street Journal
(November 24, 2010) at http://
www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/FD367F2193690
31C872577E50044FFCA?Open
Document
18. Hafuz Ahmad and Amir Khil,
“Commentary: Afghans Disillusioned by Electoral Politics,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting
(July 22, 2010) and Malalai Joya,
“Why Afghans Have No Hope in
This Week’s Elections,” CommonDreams.org (August 18, 2009) at
http://www.commondreams.
org/view/2009/08/18-10
19. Jonathan S. Landay, “Factory,
Coal Mine Show Connections
Matter Most in Afghan Business,”
McClatchy Newspapers (November 14, 2010) at http://www.
mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/14/
v-print/103393/afghanbusiness-model-connections.
html. See also Patrick Cockburn,
“Kabul’s New Elite Live High
on Western Largesse; ‘Gilded
Cage’ Lifestyle Reveals the Ugly
Truth about Foreign Aid in
Afghanistan,” The Independent
(May 1, 2009) at http://www.
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●●dire poverty amidst ostentatious wealth (villas in Kabul and on the Dubai coast) as
Afghan people suffer under a powerful elite tied to Karzai and the U.S19;
●●Karzai was a puppet from day one and continues to be notwithstanding his periodic
outbursts;
●●Afghanistan ranks worst in gender inequality amongst 25 Asia Pacific nations20;
●●civilians slaughtered by US/NATO are magically transformed into “insurgents”;
●●The AP, NYT, Washington Post, NPR and PBS continue to serve as mouthpieces
of Obama’s Pentagon;
●●the pitiful state and utter unreliability of the Afghan National Police21 which is
thoroughly infiltrated by the Taliban and much of the Afghan National Army22
(exactly a replay of the South Vietnamese militaries when Nixon began his doomed
Vietnamization strategy in 1970 with a significantly better South Vietnamese puppet
army and the inability of the Afghan Army to recruit southern Pashtuns) AN OXFAM
report compiled by Rebecca Barber described now Afghan police and army commit
crimes such as child abuse, torture and killings with impunity23;
●●U.S and NATO forces rely upon local war lords’ private militias to provide security24;
●●a largely stalled reconstruction effort as a result of de facto Taliban control of 70-80%
of Afghanistan where they collect taxes, enforce sharia, provide security, etc.;
●●periodic pleas for and/or reports about “flipping the Taliban” (Michael Semple,
now at the Carr Institute - a flagship of the humanitarian imperialists - pushes that)
will never work as it is now a war of national liberation (against US/NATO and its
Quisling in Kabul;
●●and trying to establish a strong, central government in Afghanistan which is a fool’s
errand25.
The following analysis is divided into two major sections: a first one which the real
war on the ground in Afghanistan during 2004-10; and a second part which critically
documents the Obama/Pentagon efforts to control the public narrative of America’s
Afghan war.

independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/
kabuls-new-elite-live-high-on-westslargesse-1677116.html
20. Abdul Qadir Siddique, “Gender
Inequality Worst in Afghanistan: UN,”
Pahjwok Afghan News (April 11, 2010)
and Christina Lamb, “The Defiant Poets’
Society,” The Sunday Times (April 26,
2009) at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/asia/article6149248.ece
21. See Andreas Ulrich and Alfred
Weinzieri, “Illiterate, Corrupt and TriggerHappy. German Trainers Describe Pitiful
State of Afghan Police,” Der Spiegel (April
7, 2010) at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,687416,00.html
22. Ann Jones, “There’s Virtually Zero
Percent Chance of There Ever Being
a Real Afghan Army – So what’s the
Pentagon Thinking About?” Alternet (September 21, 2009) at http://
www.alternet.org/world/142775/
there’s_virtually_zero_percent_chance_
of_there_ever_being_a_real_afghan_

army_--_so_what’s_the_pentagon_talking_about
23. ”Afghan Police Committing Crimes
with Impunity,” Pajhwok Afghan News
(May 10, 2011) at http://www.pajhwok.
com/en/2011/05/10/afghan-policecommitting-crimes-impunity-oxfam
24. Detailed in Gareth Porter, “U.S. NATO
Forces Rely on Warlords for Security,”
IPS-Inter Press Service (October 29,
2009) at http://original.antiwar.com/
porter/2009/10/29/us-nato-forces-relyon-afghan-warlords-for-security/
25. as cogently argued by Melvin A.
Goodwin who spent 42 years with
the CIA, the National War College, and
the U.S. Army, in his “WPost Misleads
on Afghan History,” Consortiumnews.
com (October 28, 2009) at http://www.
consortiumnews.com/2009/102809a.
html and “Five Myths on Afghanistan,”
Truthout.org (October 8, 2009) at http://
www.truth-out.org/10080910
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26. See my “Another Wedding
Party Massacre: 47 Afghan
Civilians Killed, including the
bride, 8 persons aged 14 to
18, 38 women and children,”
Afghan Victim Memorial Project
(July 14, 2008) at http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/
Anotherweddingpartymassacre_July62008.html
27. Details in Gareth Porter,
“How McChrystal and Petraeus
Built an Indiscriminate ‘Killing
Machine’,” IPS News (September
26, 2011) at http://www.truthout.org/how-mcchrystal-andpetraeus-built-indiscriminatekilling-machine/1317052524
28. Greg Jaffe, “U.S. Commanders Told to Shift Focus
to More Populated Areas,”
Washington Post (September
22, 2-009) at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/09/21/
AR2009092103704.html
29. “The Runaway General,”
Rolling Stone (June 22, 2010)
30. Luke Cohen, Joseph H.
Felter, Radha K. Iyengar and
Jacob Shapiro, “The Effect of
Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq” (Cambridge, Mass.:
National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) Working Paper
Series No. 16152, July 2010), 70
pp. at http://operationspaix.net/
IMG/pdf/NBER_civilian_casualties_in_afghanistan_and_
iraq_2010-07-26_.pdf
31. Graeme Smith, “Report
Slams Tactic of Night Raids
on Afghan Homes,” The Globe
& Mail (December 28, 2008)
at http://kaydka.com/Affart.
aspx?ida=1826&co=5&tr=193
32. See Abdullah Obaidi,
“Afghan Fury at Koran Burning
Claims,” Institute for War & Peace
Reporting (October 27, 2009) at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KJ28Df01.html
33. Chris Floyd, “An Unaccustomed Truth: American Commander Admits Afghan Atrocities,”
chris-floyd.com (March 27, 2010)
at http://www.chris-floyd.
com/component/content/
article/1-latest-news/1949-anunaccustomed-truth-americancommander-admits-afghanatrocities.html
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“I was still holding my grandson’s hand – the rest was gone.”
What a U.S Air Force “precision” strike turned yet
another Afghan wedding into on July 6, 200826

This section traces four phases in America’s Afghan war, then documents the soaring
civilian impact deaths as of 2006 (Table 1). A critical analysis and contrast is then made
of the various Afghan “body counts” (Table 2). The increasing reliance upon killing
vehicles which are out of public sight – night raids by secretive JSOC troops and drone
warfare – involving minimal U.S casualties is the latest phase. Obama’s two generals
in Afghanistan - McChrystal and Petraeus - built a deadly and indiscriminate “killing
machine” involving CIA and JSOC Special Forces teams27.
The American war in Afghanistan after the first three years (2001-3) has followed a
demonstrable sequence:
Time period

U.S. offensive thrust

Resulted in problem of

2004-6

Recruit NATO troops

Growing Taliban success

2006-8

Heavy reliance upon air strikes

NATO criticism of civilian deaths

2009

Obama/McChrystal shift to fewer air strikes, more
ground attacks

Rising U.S military casualties

2010

In face of Taliban successes, Obama/Petraeus shift
back to air war, drones and Special Forces/CIA night
raids

Rising civilian deaths

As the war dragged on foreign forces’ stated goals were scaled back, e.g., from building
a democratic nation-building so dear to the humanitarian imperialists to buying time
while Afghan police and army forces can be trained sufficiently for the US/NATO
to exit. Foreign occupation forces have employed variants of sheer military force and
counterinsurgency “win the hearts and minds” tactics. U.S/NATO tactics shifted from
setting up forward operating bases in remote areas to shifting back to merely protecting
cities and from reliance upon air strikes to favoring attacks by ground forces 28. The
US/NATO forces in 2008-9 had finally been forced to concede that civilian casualties
were fuelling the Afghan resistance which led to a change of generals from McKiernan
to McChrystal. “General McChrystal says that for every innocent person you kill, you
create 10 new enemies”29. A recent study by the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) found that each time U.S/NATO forces “accidentally” killed Afghan civilians,
the resistance forces retaliated with six additional attacks upon foreign forces30.
But it goes way beyond mere wounding and killing. The resistance is strengthened by the
knocking down doors of a home at midnight31, entering homes, pulling Afghan women
be their hair, abductions and beatings, desecration of the Koran32, wanton shootings
at checkpoints33, and simple everyday incidents of western arrogance and insensitivity.
A lesser level of Afghan resistance is displayed by NATO’s slick weekly being primarily used in Kabul as food wrapping. The fortnightly Sada-e Azad – Voice of Freedom
newspaper packed full of pro-NATO propaganda is put out by German psychological
operations taskforce at NATO’s Kabul headquarters and costs 400,000 British pounds
to produce 800,000 copies34.
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34. Jerome Starkey, “NATO’s
Voice is Stifled as Propaganda Newspaper Ends Up as
Food Wrapping,” Times Online
(November 12, 2009) at http://
www.comebackalive.com/
phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=
46249&start=0#p460039
35. see my “The Politics of
Counting Dead Afghan Civilians:
Responses by the Libertarian
Right and Obama Liberals
to McChrystal’s Numbers,”
RAWA News (April 21, 2010) at
http://www.rawa.org/temp/
runews/2010/04/21/the-politics-of-counting-dead-afghancivilians.html
36. in my “Counting the Dead
Attempts to hide the number
of Afghan civilians killed by US
bombs are an affront to justice,”
The Guardian (August 8, 2002)
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2002/aug/08/afghanistan.comment
37. Aldo A. Benini and Lawrence
H. Moulton, “Civilian Victims
in an Asymmetrical Conflict.
Operation Enduring Freedom,
Afghanistan,” Journal of Peace
Research 41, 4 (2004): 403-422.
The Benini & Moulton study
calculates civilian deaths from
bombing, landmines, unexploded ordnance strikes, from
non-Western ground forces
and should hence significantly
exceed a count focused upon
deaths directly caused by U.S.
aerial bombing or ground
attacks. The Benini & Moulton
study based upon canvassing
600 communities covers September 12, 2001 – June 20, 2002,
whereas Herold covers October
7, 2001 – July 31, 2002. Field
staff visited all 600 communities
directly affected by fighting
(both airstrikes and ground
combat).
38. A summary of the UNAMA
data made be found at
“Afghanistan Civilian Casualties:
Year by Year, Month by Month,”
The Guardian (August 2010) at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/
news/datablog/2010/aug/10/
afghanistan-civilian-casualtiesstatistics
39. See my “One Month of
the Obama Killing Machine
in Afghanistan: Data and a
Lesson for the UNAMA and Its
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Various body counts of civilian Afghan casualties have been published.35 My numbers
of such deaths began rising in 2006 as Table 2 documents. Afghan civilian casualties at
the hands of the U.S and NATO steadily rose from 2005-2007.
Year
Air war Oct 7 - Dec
9, 2001

Low count

High count

Mid-point

2,569

2,949

2,759

Dec 10- 31st

116

116

116

Injured who later
died, Oct-Dec 2001

640

796

718

2002

180

180

180

2003

64

64

64

2004

59

59

59

2005

59

71

65

2006

660

782

721

2007

1,010

1,297

1,154

2008

864

1,017

941

2009

926

1,077

1,002

2010

801

904

853

7,948

9,312

8,632

Cumulative

Table 1. Afghan Civilians Killed by Direct
US/NATO Actions (impact deaths)
Note: the data omits most victims of
the U.S drone strikes in the border
region with Pakistan numbering close
to 1,000 deaths.

The Afghan war of national liberation began in 2006. Very little data other than my
own was published for the years prior to 2006, though some counts were made of the
numbers killed during the early U.S. bombing campaign which I reviewed in August
200236. Interestingly, a study employing a statistical population-based estimating procedure published in 2004 came to almost identical numbers as my own for the same
time period37. Benini & Moulton calculated 3,994 civilians died from air and artillery
bombardments, shooting, and other violence. In other words, the Herold count of
3,620 civilians killed by U.S. air and ground attacks alone is extremely close to the
population-based estimate of Benini & Moulton.
The following Table 2 summarizes various counts of Afghan civilians killed by direct
action (air and ground) by U.S and NATO forces from 2006 through the first ten
months of 2010. The regular counts are mine and that by the UNAMA38. A main difference between the two is that the UNAMA refuses to publish disaggregated data and
thereby prevents any fact-checking (or reproducing its data). We are simply asked to
believe based upon faith39. In addition, since 2009, the UNAMA official in Kabul in
charge of such data collection is Ms. Georgette Gagnon, who previously worked with
Human Rights Watch (HRW), an organization bankrolled by George Soros and with
a long, notorious history of over- counting deaths caused by U.S enemies and undercounting those resulting from U.S actions (cases include Iraq in 1991, Kosovo in 1999,
and Afghanistan during 2001-2007). UNAMA’s credibility as an impartial broker in
Afghanistan is questioned by many in Kabul. In general the UNAMA figures (which
include deaths caused by Afghan army and police forces and well as foreign forces) capture a little over half those included in my count (except for 2008), all the while greatly
exaggerating deaths caused by the Taliban. Human Rights Watch only published figures
for 2006 and 200740. The Afghan Human Rights Monitor (ARM), an independent
human rights organization based in Kabul also publishes counts. A graphical summary
of the Table 2 data is also included. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) publishes sporadic counts. NATO has reported data on civilians killed
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Groupies,” RAWA News (March
10, 2010) at http://www.rawa.
org/temp/runews/2010/03/10/
one-month-of-the-obamakilling-machine-in-afghanistandata-and-a-lesson-for-the-unama-and-its-groupies.phtml
40. In its Troops in Contact.
Airstrikes and Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan (New York:
Human Rights Watch, 2008)
at http://www.hrw.org/en/
reports/2008/09/08/troopscontact-0
41. See my “The Pentagon’s
Fantasy Numbers on Afghan
Civilian Deaths,” Global Research
(April 18, 2010) at http://
www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=18718
42. The NATO report is dutifully
transmitted by the Los Angeles
Times in David S. Cloud, “Afghan
Civilian Deaths Rise. U.S.
statistics show an 11% increase
this year in fatalities by Western
forces,” Los Angeles Times
(November 2, 2010).

by NATO actions during 2008-2010, but the figures are not credible.41 For example,
NATO stated that its forces killed 144 Afghan civilians in the first ten months of 2009,
and 160 during the same period in 201042. It baldly asserted that during Jan-Nov. 18th
in 2010, 59 civilians were killed in air sorties (fixed wing and helicopters), adding that
“civilian deaths were down.” Naturally, this Pentagon “news” was relayed by the Associated Press and picked up by the Washington Post43. A quick glance at Table 2 reveals that
to be utter nonsense. The well-known research organization, the National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) released an academic report this year based upon declassified U.S. figures for Jan. 2009 – March 2010.44 It found 551 Afghan civilians being
killed by U.S. forces, as compared to 1,195 in my data base; in other words, the U.S.
“misses” over half those killed by its own actions.
Table 2. Various Counts of Afghan Civilian Casualties, 2006 - 2010
Notes: Herold, ARM and the NBER include only Afghan civilians killed by U.S and NATO militaries. Herold data is the
midpoint between high and low counts. Human Rights Watch (HRW) counts Afghans killed by foreign forces. UNAMA,
AIHRC and the ARM count Afghan civilians killed by pro-government forces which includes the Afghan army and police).
NATO includes Afghan civilians killed by its own forces.
*the 551 figure is for January 2008 – March 2009, I have annualized the NBER data, meaning derived the figure for twelve
months in 2009.
**for first 7 months in Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, “Civilian Casualty Figure: First Seven Months of
2010” (Kabul: AIHRC, August 8, 2010) at http://www.aihrc.org.af/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/Thematic/Civilian_Casualities_Jan_Jul31_2010.pdf

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Herold1

721

1,153

941

1,012

853

HRW

230

434

-

-

440

UNAMA

(230)

629

828

596

ARM

-

-

1,070

576

512

AIHRC

-

-

-

283**

305**

NATO (Jan-Oct)

-

-

-

144

160

NBER

-

-

-

441 (551*)

-

43. Deb Reichmann, “Coalition
Ramps up Air War over Afghanistan,” Associated Press (November 30, 2010) at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/11/30/
AR2010113002746.html
44. Luke Cohen, Joseph H. Felter,
Radha K. Iyengar and Jacob
Shapiro, op.cit.
45. Spencer Ackerman, “Commandos Hold Afghan Detainees
in Secret Jails,” Wired.com (April
8, 2011) at http://www.wired.
com/dangerroom/2011/04/
commandos-hold-afghandetainees-in-secret-jails/
46. Karen DeYoung and Greg
Jaffe, “U.S. ‘Secret War’ Expands
Globally as Special Operations Forces Take Larger Role,”
Washington Post (June 4, 2010).
See also Tom Eley, “Killings of
Civilians in Afghanistan: US
Special Forces Covered Up
Massacre,” Global Research
(April 8, 2010) at http://www.
globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=18554
47. See Jeremy Kuzmarov, “The
Phoenix Program was a Disaster
in Vietnam and Would Be in
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http://hnn.us/articles/116462.
html and especially Douglas
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(New York: William Morrow,
1990).
48. Nick Davies, “Afghanistan
War Logs: Task Force 373 – Special Forces Hunting Top Taliban,”
The Guardian (July 25, 2010)
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2010/jul/25/task-force373-secret-afghanistan-taliban
49. Davies, op. cit.
50. Liliana Segura, “As U.S.
Admits Killing and Covering
up Pregnant Afghan Women’s
Murder, Karzai Goes Rogue,”
Alternet (April 5, 2010) at http://
www.pdamerica.org/articles/
news/2010-04-06-09-25-25news.php
51. Jerome Starkey, “US Special
Forces ‘Tried to Cover-up’ Botched Khataba Raid in Afghanistan,” The Times (April 5, 2010) at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/news/world/afghanistan/
article7087637.ece
52. Read more: http://www.rawa.
org/temp/runews/2009/04/12/
americaand-8217-s-afghanwar-the-real-world-versusobamaand-8217-s-marketedimagery.html#ixzz15jNxLeSi
53. at http://pubpages.unh.
edu/~mwherold/ob_AbrotherofJannatGul_april82009.html
54. For example, expressed in
Chris Sands, “War-Weary People
Fear Little Hope for Peace,” The
National (March 9, 2009) at
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090309/
FOREIGN/614496422/1002 ,
Kathy Gannon, “Afghans Fed up
with Government, U.S.,” Associated Press (September 5, 2008)
at http://www.commondreams.
org/headline/2008/09/07-3 and
Abdus Sattar Ghazali, “Obama
Embraces Bush’s ‘War on Terror’
Policy Without Naming It So,”
OpEdNews (February 25, 2009)
at http://www.amperspective.
com/html/obama_embraces_.
html
55. Based upon counterinsurgency theory which calls for a
ratio of troops to inhabitants
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Afghan civilians today die primarily from aerial strikes (fixed wing, helicopters and
drones) and helicopter-borne ground raids by secretive JSOC (Joint Special Operations
Command) forces. The latter involve the notorious night-time assassination raids by
Special Operations Forces and CIA units which are shrouded in deep secrecy and rarely
get reported upon. JSOC also operates some 20 secret jails across Afghanistan. 45 Under
Obama such secret operations known in the military as “man hunters” have sharply
increased46. The political usefulness is that such secret operations keep the American
public in the dark. These CIA or Special Operations Force units in the infamous Project
Phoenix mimic the CIA-trained Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) employed
in Vietnam which murdered from 20-40,000 Vietnamese civilians47. Once in a while
details emerge of the massacres perpetrated by such units, e.g., TF-373 comprised
mostly of 7th Special Forces Group members is amply written up in the liberated
WikiLeaks documents48. For example, on June 17, 2007, launched a mission
…hundreds of miles south in Paktika province. The target was a notorious Libyan
fighter, Abu Laith al-Libi. The unit was armed with a new weapon, known as Himars
– High Mobility Artillery Rocket System – a pod of six missiles on the back of a
small truck. The plan was to launch five rockets at targets in the village of Nangar
Khel where TF 373 believed Libi was hiding and then to send in ground troops.
The result was that they failed to find Libi but killed six Taliban fighters and then,
when they approached the rubble of a madrasa, they found “initial assessment of 7
x NC KIA” which translates as seven non-combatants killed in action. All of them
were children. One of them was still alive in the rubble: “The Med TM immediately
cleared debris from the mouth and performed CPR.” After 20 minutes, the child
died49.
Another glimpse was provided when details leaked out about a US Special Forces
assault on a party on February 12, 2010 that left a local district attorney, a local police
commander and three Afghan women dead (a teenage girl and two of whom were pregnant)50. The U.S troops sealed-off the compound after the raid, extracted bullets from
their victims and tried to cover-up the slaughter51. At first the U.S. military denied the
killings but persistent reports in the British press – not the American media – eventually
led to the admission. Dozens of other examples could be provided.
A Scottish aid worker, Linda Norgrove, was killed on October 8, 2010 by a U.S. Special
Forces soldier, but the U.S. military initially blamed the death on her Taliban captors,
even concocting lurid stories. Fifty-six Afghan children were killed in a midnight raid
on April 9, 2009 by US/NATO forces after Obama became Commander-in-Chief52.
Details on this deadly raid in a village west of Khost city may be found in The Afghan
Victim Memorial Project data base53.
As Obama’s Afghan “surge” unfolded, more fighting and more civilian deaths were
certain (as well as renewed efforts by the United States to redefine, omit and suppress
reporting upon such). The U.S. mainstream media has been mostly be a cooperative
partner in the Pentagon’s news management, though of course exceptions exist (such
examples are cited in footnotes, e.g., Gareth Porter, Glenn Greenwald, Chris Hedges,
etc.). Many in Afghan see no realistic prospect for peace as long as foreign soldiers
remain in Afghanistan and the Taliban have no incentive to compromise when they are
in a winning position54. An additional 30,000 U.S troops – the Obama surge – means
nothing in a country where military experts estimate that ~500,000 foreign soldiers
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would be necessary to quell the resistance55. The simple truth is that the U.S/NATO
like the Russians twenty years ago does not have a sufficient number of troops to hold
territory56. As Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former ambassador to the USSR, put it, both
invaders had tactics without strategy57.
While much continuity with Bush policies exists, some opportunistic changes in the
execution of the Afghan war have been made by Obama. Most are inspired by the aim
to better market/spin “the good war” to the American public58 and especially to European publics. For example, under McChrystal U.S/NATO forces were relying less upon
deadly air strikes which are 4-10 times more deadly for Afghan civilians than are ground
attacks59. As a consequence, the monthly total of Afghan civilians killed by US/NATO
action declined moderately at the same time as the monthly death toll of occupation
forces rose (Table 3). U.S occupation troop deaths from hostile action have soared since
2007: 2007, 83; 2008, 133; 2009, 268 and in 2010, 44060.

Table 3. Monthly Fatalities of Afghan Civilians (killed by US/NATO) Action and of Foreign Occupation
Troops’ Hostile Fatalities Involved in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2008 – December 2010
Sources: Afghan civilians from my Afghan Victim Memorial Project data base and foreign occupation
troop fatalities from ICasualties.org at http://www.icasualties.org/oef/
(1) Afghan Civilian Deaths
October 2008
November 2008
December 2008
January 2009
February 2009
March 2009

(2) US/NATO troop deaths

Ratio of (1)/(2)

91-97

18

5.1-5.4

95-138

12

7.9-11.5

41

26

1.6

112-120

21

5.3-5.7

50

24

2.1

36

25

1.4

April 2009

77-82

10

6.4-8.2

May 2009

147-220

23

6.4-9.6

June 2009

109-133

33

3.3-4.0

July 2009

47-56

65

0.7-0.9

August 2009

64-66

72

0.9-1.1

99-118

61

1.6-1.9

62-69

61

1.0-1.1

November 2009

66

29

2.3

December 2009

57-61

32

1.8-1.9

September 2009
October 2009

January 2010

72

39

1.8

February 2010

82-88

50

1.6-1.8

March 2010

28-39

35

0.8-1.1

April 2010

30-35

28

1.1-1.3

May 2010

40-47

47

0.9-1.0

June 2010

68-98

84

0.8-1.2

July 2010

55-61

75

0.7-0.8

August 2010

82-89

75

1.1-1.2

September 2010

78-86

46

1.7-1.9

October 2010

149-165

63

2.4-2.6

November 2010

54-61

51

1.1-1.2

December 2010

63-65

39

1.6-1.7
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62. Sebastian Abbot, “Villagers
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Jan-Dec 2007, average monthly
civilian deaths caused by “coalition” forces hovered around 50
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Petraeus stint (Jan 2007 – Sept
2008) they were about 100 a
month.
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Objections,” Deutsche PresseAgentur (December 6, 2010) at
http://www.monstersandcritics.
com/news/southasia/news/
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66. Tony Iltis, “The Rise of the
Killer Machines,” Green Left
Weekly (December 5, 2010) at
http://www.greenleft.org.au/
node/46341
67. Figures reported in Bill Van
Auken, “US Escalates Killing
on Both Sides of AfghanistanPakistan Border,” wsws.org
(September 29, 2010) at http://
www.wsws.org/articles/2010/
sep2010/pers-s29.shtml
68. A rare case study of such a
drone strike which killed 12-23
Afghan civilians in Daikundi
province on February 21, 2010 is
provided in David S. Cloud, “Predator Drones: High-tech Tools
and Human Errors,” Los Angeles
Times (April 10, 2011) at http://
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As a result, the ratio of Afghan civilians killed per occupation soldier death - a measure/
metric of the lethality of America’s Afghan war for Afghan civilians relative to that for
US/NATO occupation troops - has been falling from above 5 during late 2008 to
about 1.3 during March 2009. In 2008, this ratio was 2.9-3.5; 4.4-5.6 in 2007; and
3.4-4.0 in 200661. When McChrystal took over the ratio fell to under 1, however when
Petreaus replaced McChrystal the ratio quickly moved above 1. Combating the Afghan
resistance with traditional ground operations is simply much more dangerous for foreign forces than relying upon the more deadly air strikes and night-time assassination
raids, both of which have soared under Petreaus. The data for September and October
2010 is grossly underestimated insofar as many civilians killed by U.S. Marines who
have replaced the British in the Sangin area of Helmand have not been reported upon
though local villagers complain bitterly about such deaths62.
Petraeus has discarded the winning-hearts-and-minds counterinsurgency (COIN)
approach, replacing it with a deadly trio of blunt force killing – air strikes, drones and
Special Operations midnight raids63. Such is hardly surprising as when Petraeus took over
in Iraq (January 2007 until September 2008) monthly civilian deaths caused by U.S/
NATO actions doubled64. Night raids by U.S Special Operations’ forces have risen now
to about 200 a month, a five-fold rise since 200965. In 2010, the rate of drone strikes
in Pakistan rose seven-fold over 200966. According to Pakistani authorities, 708 people
were killed in 51 drone strikes during 2009. The toll for nine months in 2010 has been
600 or more in 75 strikes67. Countless civilians are slaughtered because drone operators
in Nevada and Florida often cannot distinguish clearly between “insurgents” and civilians68. If drones now even kill U.S. Marines, one can only wonder about the carnage
perpetrated upon Afghan and Pashtun civilians69. Drone strikes’ remain shrouded in
official secrecy70. U.S. counterinsurgency experts, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum
also cite the 700 figure71. Moreover, a strong case can be that besides further fuelling
the Af-Pak resistance by producing enormously high levels of anger and rage against
the United States” as even recognized by Kilcullen and Exum 72, by the standards of
international law, drone warfare is illegal73.
Obama stated that US/NATO forces in Afghanistan were wagers of peace74. America’s
propaganda ministers and generals cover-up that the Taliban & Co. are winning in
Afghanistan75. Neil Faulkner editor of Military Times magazine interpreted the battle
of Marjah in Helmand province,
In reality, Marjah is a vaguely-defined area of villages, markets and family compounds. If there are tens of thousands of people, they are spread across 125 sq miles.
Marjah was invented because a military operation has to have a clear-cut goal to be
deemed a victory. President Obama had doubled the total US troop deployment, but
public support was waning. The generals needed a victory, so they created Marjah
and planned Operation Moshtarak to capture it. A phantom city was needed because
the enemy is a phantom. A task force is assembled and motors into bandit country.
If it is too small, it risks annihilation. If it is too big, it finds itself punching the air.
A golden rule of guerrilla warfare is that you fight only if you are certain to win. So
the invaders of Afghanistan are waging a war against an enemy who is never there.
“Suppose we were (as we might be),” wrote T. E. Lawrence, “an influence, an idea,
a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas?
Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to
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see their “Death from Above,
Outrage down Below,” New York
Times (May 17, 2009) at http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/05/17/
opinion/17exum.html
73. See Max Kantar, “International Law: The First Casualty
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(December 12, 2009) at http://
www.globalresearch.ca/index.
php?context=va&aid=16539
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the head. We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed... Ours should be a war of
detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast, unknown
desert ...”76.
Powerful parallels exist between the US/NATO offensives in Helmand and Kandahar
now with that of the Soviets in the Panjshir valley in 1982. As the veteran international
journalist and writer Edward Girardet noted, during the 1980s
The Soviets thought they could subdue Afghanistan through brute force, political
indoctrination, and bribes. They wanted to put across the notion that their form
of government had far more to offer than the jihad embraced by the mujahideen.
They lost77.
The much heralded battle of Kandahar promised to be more of the same.
How pathetic to hear U.S. troops whine that the Taliban are too weak to engage foreign
forces in a conventional, manly manner and then trumpet loudly that in every pitched
battle the Taliban are soundly defeated. Yet, Afghanistan is more dangerous now than it
has ever been during the American war according to international organizations and
humanitarian groups78. Faced with superior force, the resistance simply melts away and
then returns when the foreign occupation forces withdraw79.
The Taliban have five aces in their hand: (1) a rugged territory which they know like the
palm of a hand; (2) the Afghan hatred of foreign domination (not the West); (3) the
Afghan belief in taking revenge for a misdeed wrought upon a person’s honor (especially
family members); and time). Fourth, William Polk argues that the U.S/NATO display a
profound misunderstanding of Afghan socio-political realities80 which plays into Taliban
hands. Polk points to the unique Afghan style of governance, the Afghan understanding
of foreign civic action programs (whether Soviet or American), and Afghans’ virulent
rejection of a foreign-imposed, corrupt minority regime. Fifth, unlike the U.S military
which requires about 7 to 8 support personnel for every combat soldier, the Taliban
travel lightly and are extremely mobile. The Taliban are widely recognized to have been
able to restore security to the areas under their control, as stated by a resident of Bala
Murgab to a Spanish journalist,
We all know that the Taliban do bad things, that sometimes they’re cruel, but since
they arrived in our village, we sleep with the doors open with no fear of being killed
or robbed. And that is much more than the government and the foreigners have
done for us81.
The situation is far worse as many “…villagers see the foreigners as the main source
of insecurity: the presence of foreign troops means IEDs, ambushes and airstrikes…”
in the words of a long-time Afghan scholar82. As Patrick Coburn reports, “One hears
again and again Afghans saying that the Taliban may not be liked but that the US is
distrusted, even hated”83.
The Taliban’s strategy is to spread out foreign occupation forces across space – the Taliban now have a presence in the north (Kunduz) and in the west (Farah); (1) to lengthen
U.S supply lines making them vulnerable; (2) to create just enough uncertainty and
danger across Afghanistan so as to prevent any reconstruction; and (3) to kill as many
foreigners as possible by primarily using IEDs and suicide attacks. On each count, the
Taliban is succeeding. For example, as the American war drags on, the following graph
reconstructed from WikiLeaks’ liberated documents clearly confirms the spread of com-

54

issn: 1988-7221
año 2012
número 5
76. Emphasis added by M.H. Neil
Faulkner, “Guerrilla of Arabia:
How One of Britain’s Most Brilliant Military Tacticians Created
the Taliban’s Battle Strategy,” The
Independent (September 17,
2010) at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/
guerrilla-of-arabia-how-one-ofbritains-most-brilliant-militarytacticians-created-the-talibansbattle-strategy-2081555.html.
77. Edward Girardet, “Afghanistan War: Lessons from the Soviet
War,” Christian Science Monitor
(March 18, 2010) at http://www.
veteranstoday.com/2010/03/19/
edward-girardet-afghanistanwar-lessons-from-the-sovietwar/ . See also Robert Fisk,
“This Strategy has been Tried
Before – Without Success,” The
Independent (December 3, 2009)
at http://www.independent.
co.uk/opinion/commentators/
fisk/robert-fisk-this-strategyhas-been-tried-before-ndashwithout-success-1833133.html
78. Derrick Crowe, “Security in
Afghanistan Crumbles as Counterinsurgency Fails,” Huffington
Post (September 13, 2010) at
http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/derrick-crowe/security-inafghanistan-c_b_714120.html
79. Numerous cases exist, for
example Sayed Salahuddin
and Peter Graff, “Taliban Say
Control Area after Battle with
U.S.,” Reuters (October 7, 2009) at
http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSSP402619
80. William R. Polk, “Legitimation
Crisis in Afghanistan,” The Nation
(April 1, 2010) at http://www.
thenation.com/article/legitimation-crisis-afghanistan
81. From the Spanish daily, El
Pais (July 4, 2009) at http://
www.elpais.com/articulo/
internacional/Estamos/librando/combates/infernales/
elpepuint/20090704elpepiint_1/
Tes. See also Miles Amoore,
“Taliban Bring Order, Say
Afghans,” The Australian
(December 14, 2009) at http://
www.uruknet.info/?new=61027
and Griff Witte, “Taliban Shadow
Officials Offer Concrete Alternative,” Washington Post (December 8, 2009) at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/12/07/
AR2009120704127.html

ISSN 1988-7221 (2012) 5: p. 44-65

Herold, M. The Obama/Pentagon War Narrative, the Real War and Where Afghan Civilian Deaths Do Matter

bat from 2004 to 200984. As the countryside became more dangerous, supplies have
been increasingly air dropped (the number of airdrops rose from 99 in 2005 to 800 in
2008)85. Most recently, the U.S military itself conceded that violence across Afghanistan
was at an all-time high and that the insurgency’s geographic reach and sophistication had
grown (curiously adding that “security was slowly spreading across the country”)86. By
late 2008, Taliban IEDs were already effective at disabling America’s new Mine Resistant
Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles87.
A map produced by the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)
released on September 10, 2009, showed substantial Taliban activity in 97% of Afghanistan, compared to 72% in 2008 and 54% in 2007.88 A concrete example is Chak in
Wardak province, a scant 40 miles west of Kabul where three years ago the Taliban controlled the district was restricted to the hours of darkness whereas now, as the independent reporter James Ferguson, tells us the Taliban rule day and night89. Already in late
2008, the independent journalist, Nir Rosen who had travelled widely in Afghanistan,
noted that “once you leave Kabul, you’re entering Taliban territory”90. A recent report
by aid agencies working in Afghanistan also emphasizes growing insecurity and soaring
civilian casualties91. A marvelous account of what Taliban-controlled Afghanistan looks
like now and what it will look like in the future after the occupation has been provided
by The Guardian’s Ghaith Abdul-Ahad92.
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Obama/Pentagon Efforts at Controlling the Narrative of America’s
Afghan War
“This is all a war of perceptions” – General Stanley McChrystal93
How does the American government seek to set the war narrative?94. First by spending billions on propaganda. During 2004-2009 the Pentagon’s annual public relations
budget increased by 63% to over $4.7 billion95. For example, at an abandoned Air Force
base in San Antonio (TX), the Pentagon’s “Hometown News” organization publishes
glowing stories about the military. In 2009, it planned to put out 5,400opress releases,
3,000 television releases and 1,600 radio interviews – 50% more than in 2007. Some
~$500 million is spent for “psychological operations” targeting foreign audiences. In
Afghanistan, funds are being spent to train Afghan journalists to engage in “responsible
journalism.” Under the Obama clock, the efforts expended to manage the news coming out from Afghanistan - or to spin the war - have soared as compared to during the
administration of his predecessor96. Most of the press is content to simply parrot the
releases and statements made by US military spokespersons97. The U.S. military is more
than willing to physically silence oppositional media, as for example with the bombing
in April 1999 of Serbia’s State Television and Radio Station building (killing 16 civilians
and wounding another 16) and two years later bombing the Al Jazeera office in Kabul
in November 200198. As regards combat reporting, the Pentagon profiles reporters,
accepting as “embeds” only those deemed by the military as being neutral or positive99.
The U.S military has also fine-tuned its procedure dealing with Afghan civilians they
kill: first say nothing; then when reports being presenting compelling evidence, deny;
when more evidence surfaces about civilians dying which cannot be denied, blame
the Taliban for the deaths: finally when the presented evidence mounts, minimize the
numbers killed —as for example in the August 2009 massacre in Azizabad where the
Pentagon initially reported the U.S airstrike killed 5 Afghan civilians, not the close to
100100 — and promise an investigation (carried out of course by themselves).
A typical example of Pentagon and official U.S mainstream failing to report a U.S attack
which resulted in civilian casualties was revealed in recently liberated documents by
WikiLeaks. A British Guardian report described a midnight raid by Special Forces upon
Jaldak, south of Qalat in Zabul Province. The early hour raid resulted in five dead males:
an 80-yr old, a 70-yr old, a 30-yr old, a 20-yr old and an 18-yr old, leaving the family
without any males101. The Jaldak elders maintain the innocence of the dead and three
detained, to the point that they refused to bury the bodies and threatened to display
them on Highway 1. At the time, the U.S. military issued a news report mentioning
that it had killed “five insurgents in a raid in the restive south” in Zabul Province. The
report noted that “having moved the women and children to safety, the force entered
the buildings, killing five armed militants ….” as relayed by the Agence France-Presse in
a wire report of January 9, 2009102. A search of Lexis-Nexis reveals one other mention
of the Zabul operation. Xinhua General News Service quoted local officials in Zabul who
stated that five civilians from one family were killed in a raid by international forces
in the wee-hours of Friday103. Countless similar examples are presented in my Afghan
Victim Memorial Project data base. Wikileaks’ liberated war logs document many cases
of how the U.S. military sanitized records of bloodbaths104.
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Contrary to U.S. military thinking which asserts that “the press heavily reports on civilian casualty incidents…civilian casualty incidents are highly ‘mediagenic’,”105 a history
exists of mainstream U.S media being megaphones for the Pentagon, e.g., Laura King
of the Associated Press and the Los Angeles Times being a case in point106. I have provided a concrete case study of how the mainstream engaged in immaculate deception
about the killing of Afghan civilians on March 24, 2010 and November 23, 2001, in
Chagoti Ghar, Khost province107.
Three main subterfuges have been used by the U.S and NATO militaries, the compliant corporate media and organizations like Human Rights Watch, to excuse the killing
and wounding of innocent Afghan civilians. The first is to express righteous anger over
“them” killing civilians intentionally whereas “we” never intentionally target civilians.
The second is to assert that the dastardly Taliban and their associates employ civilians
as human shields. A third means used by the Pentagon and compliant U.S mainstream
media has been to simply omit whenever possible written reports and especially photos
of the victims of U.S/NATO military actions (as below), all the while amply publishing
stories and photos of Afghan civilians killed by IED’s or suicide bombers (good bodies).
In other words, as pointed out long ago by Edward Herman there are good bodies and
bad bodies in America’s wars108.
The intentionality argument is often couched in the language of justifiable collateral
damage, regrettable but necessary. Since the killing was collateral, it cannot be intentional goes the story. Least-cost considerations (in terms of U.S. military deaths and
U.S. dollars) by the US and NATO militaries directly translates into tens of thousands
of Afghan civilian casualties. How? During the initial phases of the U.S. bombing
campaign but still today, U.S. warplanes dropped powerful bombs in civilian-rich areas
with little concern for Afghan civilians. Today, the aerial bombing is more related to
close air support called-in by ground forces as a means to defeat the enemy without
having to fight him on the ground and likely suffer casualties. The killing of civilians
by the United States has long been excused away as “tragic errors.” More significantly,
a new term was coined around 1990, collateral damage (which was linked to unintentional), which soon became an essential part of the U.S war narrative. The U.S/NATO
war managers dredge out the tired old “intent” argument. As Edward Herman noted,
…it is claimed by the war managers that these deaths and injuries are not deliberate,
but are only “collateral” to another end, they are treated by the mainstream media,
NGOs, new humanitarians, and others as a lesser evil than cases where civilians are
openly targeted. But this differential treatment is a fraud, even if we accept the sometimes disputable claim of inadvertence (occasionally even acknowledged by officials
to be false, as described below). Even if not the explicit target, if collateral civilian
deaths are highly probable and statistically predictable they are clearly acceptable and
intentional. If in 500 raids on Afghan villages alleged to harbor al Qaeda cadres it is
likely that civilians will die in 450 of them, those deaths are an integral component
of the plan and the clear responsibility of the planners and executioners. As law
professor Michael Tonry has said, “In the criminal law, purpose and knowledge are
equally culpable states of mind109.
Aerial bombing in the name of liberating Afghans will continue with little regard
for Afghan civilians who for the Western politico-military elites (and general public)
remain simply invisible in the empty space which is an “increasingly aerially occupied
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Afghanistan”110. The compliant mainstream media perpetuates the myth by serving as
stenographer of the Pentagon’s virtual reality. When details of Afghan civilian deaths do
leak through the US/NATO news management efforts, a Lt. Colonel at Bagram offers
“sincere regrets” or the promise of an investigation and by tomorrow all is forgotten.
They are, after all, just Afghans “we” killed. Theirs are bad bodies, not good bodies.
A myth has circulated since the beginning of the U.S. bombing campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001. The myth is endlessly repeated by the U.S. occupation forces,
corporate media, the Pentagon, defense intellectual pundits, the Cruise Missile Left, the
humanitarian interventionists, and even some in the United Nations: Afghan insurgents
hide amongst civilians whom they use as human shields. To begin with, the assertion is
never empirically documented but just merely stated as a self-evident truth. Secondly,
the implication is that an insurgent or Taliban fighter, resisting the U.S./NATO invasion should stand alone on a mountain ridge, his AK-47 raised to the sky, and engage
in a “fair” act of war with an Apache attack helicopter or A-10 Warthog and see who
prevails. Thirdly, what is conveniently omitted is that the insurgents have lived in the
area, have friends and families in the communities, and that such a local support base
is precisely what gives a guerrilla insurgency (along with knowledge of the local terrain)
its classic advantage. Such local connection means that the insurgents will (unlike the
US/NATO occupation forces) go to great lengths to not put local people in danger.
Time magazine produced a strong, timely piece of gruesome propaganda when it put
the face of a young Afghan girl with her nose cut off “by the Taliban” on its magazine
cover. At the time, the Taliban denied having done so, but the mainstream media
ignored the denial. We now know that the girl was punished by her father for running
away from her abusive husband numerous times, as reported by the independent Afghan
Independent Human Rights Commission111. Any retraction from the likes of Time, the
Associated Press, the Washington Post, etc.? Of course not.
The mainstream war narrative directed at Euro-American public resembles a sea of lies:
Obama’s mega and mini lies, NATO lies, UNAMA lies, NBER academic lies, Associated Press lies112, mainstream media lies, and Lara Logan (of CBS 60 Minutes) lies. The
sea is stocked with lies of omission and of commission employed to construct the war
narrative. A sample listing of news as instruction not information follows though each
merits an extended discussion:
●●Announcing the killing of “important” Taliban or Al Qaeda leader alleged to have
been eliminated by a drone in the Af-Pak border region but who then resurface weeks
or months later (the multiple lives of resistance leaders113;
●●Announcing with great fanfare the capture of “Taliban,” who are then soon
released, e.g., Petraeus’ captured ‘Taliban” have been over 80% civilian114. But this
now intentional as US night raids are aimed at Afghan civilians (who are held briefly
in order to extract information)115;
●●Proclaiming victory in taking over (the fictional) city of Marjah a success then116 and
Kandahar now and so many other futile “surges” during the past nine years (of areas
allegedly cleared but which are then re-occupied by the Taliban)117;
●●Misrepresenting U.S human cost of war (let alone the carnage in Afghanistan) by
hiring mercenaries (including a staggering number of private contractors- by late
2009, 64,000 U.S troops and 104,000 contractors shared the Afghan battlefield, the
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highest ratio of contractors to military personnel in U.S. history118 and Green Card
soldiers119), outsourcing combat to lackey nations (e.g., most recently Slovakia, Czech
Republic even Mongolia120);
●●Enemy body counts bearing no connection with reality solemnly proclaimed at
Bagram or in Kabul reminiscent of Saigon’s “Five O’clock Follies”121;
●●Widespread torture and secret imprisonment (see Omar Khadr case) with impunity;
somehow the CIA torture tapes just disappeared and no one is held accountable);
far less transparency at Obama’s secret penal colony, Bagram, and hidden CIA bases
in Afghanistan where torture was routine122 . Bagram prison has been massively
enlarged under Obama and represents a black hole where “illegal enemy combatants”
are incarcerated, cannot see lawyers, have no trials and never see any evidence there
may be against them123. The U.S. continues to transfer persons picked up in raids to
the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS), widely acknowledged to engage
in vicious torture124;
●●U.S. abuse of detainees has been routine at Afghanistan bases125;
●●Hiding the fact that all too many US soldiers from General “mad dog” Mattis who
famously proclaimed he enjoyed killing126 to the Stryker Brigade boys who took
photos posing with dead Afghan civilians127 to the US Army Green Beret who shot
an Afghan and cut off his ear as a trophy128, and the trigger-happy helicopter pilots,
enjoy killing enemy Afghans;
●●Massive Pentagon propaganda effort to magnify or invent civilian deaths caused by
resistance side and to completely suppress reports of those killed by US/NATO forces;
●●Trumpeting on-going discussions with “moderate” Taliban (these Taliban are
ex-Taliban now dimly viewed by the fighting Taliban) when the real Taliban have
repeatedly stated that no negotiations will take as long as Afghanistan is an occupied
country;
●●The assiduous use of language to sell war (e.g., the resistance is terrorism), foreign
peacemaking forces not occupation forces, etc.;
●●Pursuing government secrecy with a zeal greater than even George W. Bush129;
●●Hotel journalism versus that by real independent, un-embedded journalists
like Jerome Starkey (The Times), Chris Sands (The National), David Lindorff
(CounterPunch), Ghaith Abdul-Ahad (The Guardian), John Pilger, or James Ferguson
(The Independent). An important element used by the US/ NATO militaries is to rely
upon embedded journalists who provide accounts favorable to these militaries (this is
NOT independent journalism). A favorite example of such an embedded mouthpiece
for the US military is CBS’s 60 minutes’ Lara Logan, a great fan (nay, groupie) of U.S
Special Forces who make the news lady breathless130. Other stellar exemplars of such
toady journalists are Laura King and Jason Strasziuso;
●●The American media regularly offers the pabulum that the Taliban are a few
dollars a-day rented fighters when the truth is that they are a disciplined, well-trained
and equipped fighting force focused upon seizing power either by conquest or by
negotiation131;
●●Failing to note that there are now at best 50-100 Al Qaeda cadres/fighters in all of
Afghanistan132;
●●The different ways in which the American media and the European media reported
upon the massive trove of information released by WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010. Lara
Logan of CBS focused only upon atrocities committed by the Taliban, which amounts
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to propaganda not journalism133. As expected, the New York Times selectively reported
on WikiLeaks documents134;
●●And generally, a discourse about politics as a Debordian spectacle 135. A total
disconnect exists between reality in Afghanistan and what Obama/the Pentagon
“instruct” the America public, e.g., most recently the Obama war “review” noting
“signs of progress” . As Floyd pointed out, a striking inversion is at work: the very
success of the Afghan resistance, its fierceness is evidence of their desperation, their
ultimate and imminent collapse136.
The vehemence with which the Obama administration seeks to control the war narrative
is revealed by the fierce reaction to the posting by WikiLeaks of internal war documents.
Each of these warrants extended discussion. Let me focus upon images and language
in service of America’s war. Western mainstream press delights in printing photos of
civilians especially children hurt or killed by Taliban attacks as for example the one
below from Yahoo!News. But do we ever see photos of the victims of US/NATO attacks?
Of course not even though such photos are taken and posted outside the U.S. (as for
example in my data base containing over 1,000 photos of Afghanistan under US bombing and occupation).
Headline: “Wounded Afghan boy lies on hospital bed”
A wounded Afghan boy lies on a hospital bed in the Emam Sehab
district of Kunduz province November 13, 2010. A bomb hidden on a
motorcycle killed at least eight civilians and wounded 18 in northern
Kunduz province, a district official said. The bomb apparently targeted
a militia leader, who was among those killed.
Source: http://news.yahoo.com/nphotos/slideshow/photo//101113/
ids_photos_wl/r3379912763.jpg/;_ylt=Ak8_D5j0fuKDL3H.fiPuMeQBS5Z4
Photo by a stringer for Reuter
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Contrast the above with these photos from RAWA. Such photos rarely appear in the
U.S., but do in Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. Such photos will not be pub-
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lished in America as they depict “bad bodies” which might make the public uncomfortable.137 Analysis of mainstream U.S. news-magazine photo coverage during the
early years of the Afghan conflict clearly revealed that the printed photographs offered
prompts for the prevailing government version of events, e.g., our troops don’t kill and
maim.138
Headline: “U.S Special Forces brutally kill 10 Afghan civilians in Narang district”

Herald Tribune (November 30,
2009) at http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/11/29/world/
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On Dec.27, 2009, at around 2:30 of mid night, US Special Forces raided Ghazi Khan Ghondi village of
Narang District in Kunar province of Afghanistan. They enter the civilian houses and kill ten civilians,
among them eight were school boys, one a poor farmer and a 12-year-old rancher. They all have been shot
in the head. Although the US occupation forces denied any involvement, but Kai Eide, special UN representative announced in a press conference that the “international forces” were engaged in the incident and
“a preliminary United Nations investigation has found that eight students were among 10 Afghan civilians
killed in Kunar province.” Further photos and details at “US Special Forces Brutally Kill 10 Afghan Civilians in
Narang – Photo Gallery,” RAWA (January 2, 2010) at http://www.uruknet.info/?p=61746
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Language is selectively employed to construct the Obama, Pentagon, mainstream media
war narrative. Almost every wire service report by the Associated Press includes “…the
Taliban regularly exaggerate casualties caused by their attacks.” A festival of Orwellian
language is deployed by the Pentagon and Commander-in-Chief Obama. Obama
was described as engaging in “Operation Redefinition” (by Jon Stewart on March 31,
2009139). Obama simply redefines the old Bush policies and tactics in Afghanistan
which largely remain in place.
On December 3, 2010, redefinition was upped another notch by Obama who snuck
into Afghanistan for a four-hour secret visit at the U.S. base, Bagram, where clad in a
bomber jacket he proclaimed the U.S. was winning the war, amidst overwhelming contrary evidence. Losing is winning and U.S. troops in Afghanistan are in ObamaSpeak
“wagers of peace.”
The war narrative regularly employs such phrases as “Taliban infested area” (why not
rewrite as “foreign occupation force infested area”?). The use of the word “terrorist”
for a military opponent is systematic, as is use of the adjective “peacekeeping” or far
worse Obama’s “wagers of peace” instead of occupation forces. Combat troop increases
are now labeled under Pentagon-Speak as “combat enablers.”140 When a US/NATO
helicopter is shot down the narrative is a helicopter made a “hard landing”, instead of
being shot down. Media spokespersons from the opposing warring side are identified
differently: a Taliban “mouthpiece” versus a “NATO spokesman.” The persons fighting
the foreign invaders are “terrorists” not resistance fighters though of course in 1980’s
the Afghans fighting the Russian invader were called “freedom fighters.”
The usual western mantra is “The Taliban often exaggerates the details of attacks and
play down the numbers of their own casualties.”141 But let’s rewrite the above substituting Americans/NATO for Taliban.
Another standard mantra is the “Insurgents continue their indiscriminate killing and
wounding of innocent civilians despite their leaderships guidance,” said U.S. Army Col.
Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint
Operations Center director. “Our thoughts and concerns are with the families during
this difficult time.” As Afghan civilian deaths rose, the U.S/NATO say, “…Sorry.”142
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William Dalrymple argues the comparison of Afghanistan today is less with Vietnam
and more with Great Britain’s Great Game of 1839-42143. In the end, the main determinant of the course of America’s Afghan war will be bodies. The increasing number
of Afghan bodies matters and fuels the resistance, resulting in what Anatol Lieven of
King’s College (London) aptly observed, Afghanistan
“is becoming a sort of surreal hunting estate, in which the U.S. and NATO breed
the very terrorists they then track down”144.
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Space does not allow an elaboration here, that the U.S attack upon and later occupation of Afghanistan in response to 9/11 terrorist attack was hoped-for by Al Qaeda
as it would cause a worldwide Muslim backlash as detailed in Syed Saleem Shahzad’s
authoritative book, Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, published in May 2011145.
The American public (except for the old left, the Unitarians and Quakers, a couple
other progressive churches, folks at the Brave New Foundation, the peace movement,
RAWA’s American supporters, and many on the libertarian Right146) does not (and has
never) care(d) about civilians killed by US military. But for liberals, Obama can do no
wrong147. They only care about U.S troop deaths. G.W Bush knew this early on – see
his banning of photos of dead U.S. military personnel at Dover Air Base. Official U.S
military bodies (killed or injured) matter in the United States. Afghan bodies count for
nothing with the American general public. Every effort will be undertaken by Obama/
Pentagon to minimize US domestic political opposition to foreign war-making. This
began in the post-Vietnam era with the shift from a drafted army to one relying upon
professional “volunteers,” who represent a narrow sliver of the country’s population.
In recent mid-term elections in the United States, only 6.5% of voters mentioned the
Afghan war as being of concern.
It’s all about controlling the US war narrative, something very different from the truth.
A first successful ploy was to entice the NATO countries into fighting in Afghanistan in
2004. The count of war dead by nationality showed that NATO stalwarts like Britain,
Canada and Holland did a disproportionate amount of the heavy lifting. Some NATO
countries understood the ploy and limited their contribution to non-fighting areas at the
time, e.g., Germany and Spain. But as the war grinded on and NATO country publics
turned decidedly against it, Bush first and Obama later sought creative new ways to
minimize officially acknowledged U.S. military casualties. Such measures included:
escalating reliance upon private contractors (privatizing American war-making) and
assorted Rambos under Obama148 (de facto mercenaries); ramping up the use Green
Card soldiers; and begging for troops from other nations. The use of contractors is
especially convenient as these are not reported as U.S. military casualties and are outside
any public scrutiny, a deliberate ploy to hide the costs of war149.
The mainstream war narrative directed at Euro-American public resembles a sea of
lies: Obama’s mega and mini lies, NATO lies, UNAMA lies, NBER academic lies,
Associated Press lies150, mainstream media lies, and Lara Logan (of CBS 60 Minutes)
lies. The sea is stocked with lies of omission and of commission employed to construct
the war narrative.
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Most twentieth century counterinsurgency wars have failed (the two exceptions being
the Americans in the Philippines and the British in Malaya). The resistance wins because
it knows the home territory and the invader cannot overcome the “foreign invader”
label.151 History carries some potent lessons.
General Sergei Akhromeyev, commander of the Soviet armed forces, address(ed) the
Soviet Politburo in 1986. “There is no piece of land in Afghanistan that has not been
occupied by one of our soldiers at some time or another. Nevertheless much of the
territory stays in the hands of the terrorists. We control the provincial centres, but we
cannot maintain political control over the territory we seize.”… General Akhromeyev
demanded extra troops – or the war in Afghanistan would continue “for a very, very
long time”. And how’s this for a quotation from, say, a British or US commander in
Helmand today? “Our soldiers are not to blame. They’ve fought incredibly bravely
in adverse conditions. But to occupy towns and villages temporarily has little value
in such a vast land where the insurgents can just disappear into the hills.” Yes, of
course, this was Gen Akhromeyev in 1986152.
The American war in Afghanistan will end after NATO country militaries withdraw.
This process began with the Dutch in 2010, the Canadians in 2011 and will accelerate
in 2011. The Germans have now announced an exit date for 2011153. No amount of
purchased or bribed Croatian, Mongolian, Lithuanian, Georgian and other such troops
can replace the old NATO contingents.
In the end, bodies tell the story, America’s lost war in Afghanistan will cease, cut by the
scissors of Afghan bodies and mounting U.S. military bodies (Figure 1).
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